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THE SUPREME
THE STATE OF
:y S. HANSEN, et al., for hi:m.telf
for and on behalf of 191 other per'\' . •
limila.rly situated,
Plaimtiff
,<
,•..•.
-vs. -

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GARY S. HANSEN, et al., for himself
aud for and on lwhalf of 191 other persons simi1arl.Y sitnah•d,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

- vs. !OOD OF LOCOMOTIVE
AND ENGINEMEN and
LODGE S-!4 of BROTHERHOOD OF
LOCOMO'l'IYE FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN.

Case No.
11726

Defendants-Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF' OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
BROTH8HHOOD OF LOCOMOTIYE FIREMEN AND
ENGIN81\fEN and LODGE 844 of BROTHERHOOD
OF' LOCOl\TOTIYE FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN

As snggcst('d b!· Rale 75(p) (2), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, this re1)l!· brief will be limited to answering new matters set forth in Respondents' brief.

Appellant::; feel that Respondents have not met the argument s!:'t forth in their brief in chief, and will not dwell
on Rt>spondcnts' arguments as such. However, Appellants fePl that Rt:•spondPnts have grossly miscited and
misconstrnPd the facts shown in the record. The record
1

certainly speaks for itself, but Ap1wllants feel dn:
bound to point out to the court the glaring errors a:
inconsistencies of Respondents' brief in this f"g"uf1j
Therefore, this reply brief will attempt to point out
errors and inconsistencies by highlighting portiom,
the record and Respondents' brief. Space does not 111.,
mit, and it would serve no purposP, to attPmpt tr1 1,
argue the brief in chief herein.
POINT I
THE FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH THE
JUDGMENT BELOW IS BASED ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

1. The evidence does not support the finding that

plaintiff Oliver was ever a member of the

BLF&E.

Respondents, m their brief (hereinafter cited a'
Resp. Br.), assert that defendants produced no record'
at trial indicating that Oliver had not made dues pa:
ments. (Resp. Br. at 5.) Oliver, as a plaintiff, had th"
burden to prove that he was a member of the BLF&E
Defendants were not obligated to producP any recoru'
of Kennecott Copper Corporation. If plaintiff Olire;
wished to prove he had paid dues, it was his burden t1
produce such records. All of the records kept by th,
BLF&E indicate that Oliver never paid dues to !ht
BLF&E. (R. 998; 924; 938; Exhibit D-190.)
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2. The evidence does not support the finding that
alleged plaintiff Esquivel is a proper party
plaintiff.

Rrspondents assert that defendants "had practical
nutice" of plaintiff gsquivel's joinder. (Resp. Br. at 7.)
In the final "Supplemental Notice of J oinder and Representation of Plaintiffs" filed on May 24, 1968, (R. 232I counsrl for plaintiffs state:
Tlw atta<'hed arnended Exhibit I, Part B, contains the names of those individuals who are members of the <'lass of plaintiffs herein but who have
not joined as individual plaintiffs herein and who
are not, to date, rP.presented by the undersigned
counsel.
Plaintiff Ht-ribPrto Esquivel is listed on that amended
Exhibit I, Part B. There was no further filing of notice
of join<ler by
plaintiff. Therefore, the last "practieal notiee" which defendants had was that Esquivel had
n1Jt joined as a plaintiff. The order of the court which
allowPd such int(TVt•ntion states specifically:
All uu·rnhen.; of the class desiring to join as

partil>s plaintiff herein are to file an appropriate

noticl· of joinder or otherwise express in writing
their desire to so join, on or before May 24, 1968.
(R. 190.)

Re::;ponch·nts citations to the record (R. 229) does not
SU]Jport a claimed extension; this is only Respondents'
motion. No ordt-r granting such motion is cited. Alleged
plaintiff Es(1nivel filed no notice of joinder. Defendants
n·1wakdly objeeted to the failure of members of the
class to intPrvPne, and moved for dismissal without

..,
•J

prejudice as to those who had not interven(•<l. rn.
Further objection was made in dPfc>rnlants' llH·inor· ·,
1
anr1111'
on damages. (R. 311-312.) Additionally d<>f<'IH.l:tnt· ,
jected orally and moYed to di::m1iss with n•f<.r!'nei·
11
individuals who had not intervened at the h<•rrinn 1·1 ,
t1gr11
the trial. (R. 667.)
•

'

(.

1
\lq

•

3. The evidence does not support the finding that
the defendants placed no condition other than
membership on the payment of strike benefits.

Respondents assert that the record discloses tha:
in prior Kennecott strikes the
paid :-;trike lwne
fits to persons who were not within the bargaining unir
represented by the BLF&:K (Resp. Br. at
Rt>spon1].
ents fail to mention what else that record discloses. Th1
record is also very clear that the BLF&E had no know]
edge that members outside the bargaining unit \We
being paid. (R. 928.) Martin J l'nsen, in his testimom.
indicated that the names of persons outside the bar
gaining unit placed on the 19()7 payroll wen• place1;
there in error ( R. 930.) and that hi' did not know it um;:
after the strike. (R. 926-928.)
4. The evidence does not support the finding that
plaintiffs Beck, D. P. Bennett, Glen Bennett,
Carter, James, Kendrick, Tsutsui, Gale and T.
N. Turner are entitled to recover strike benefits.

On page 14 of their brief, Respondents atkmpt \(i
justify the failure of nine plaintiffs to introdnce evi
dence in their behalf. rrhPI'P is clearly no evidrnce (I'
reliance by these men in the record. Then' is no en
4

denee that they ever heard any representations allegedly
rnadP h,\· employees of defendants. Respondents admit
this when they admit these plaintiffs did not answer
interrogatories propounded to them. Further, there is
1111 r·vi<lence as to the good standing of these plaintiffs
smc.r tht>y ·were excluded, by their own counsel, from the
,.;ii'nlation rPli<>d upon h,\· thP balance of i)laintiffs. (R.
lOU0-1061.) Tlw fact that none of the other plaintiffs
failed to sho-\\' reliance certainly has no relevance to
these nine. This was a spurious class action and these
plaintiffs had to prove their own case. Thus, plaintiffs
tkek, D. P. Bt>nnPtt, GlPn Bennett, Carter, James, Kendrick, Tsntsui, Gale and T. N. Turner are not entitled
to recover in this action. The finding of the court allowing thPm to recover is clearly unsupported by the evidence.
5. Sub-points 4 through 11 of Respondents' brief
contain numerous incorrect citations to the
record in this case. The record does not support
the findings made by the court.
On pag-(• 11 of their brief, Respondents state that

th Grand Lodge of Defendant had knowledge of prom-

al!Pgedly made because "certain of the handbills
and flyers which prornisE>d strike benefits were in fact
i1n•pareJ by the BLF&E in Cleveland, Ohio, and transmitted to TTtah for circulation in the campaign." In
' 11Jlport of that statempnt, Respondents cite R. 758-759,
1103-1104 and Exhibits P-54, 60 and 70. The record at
pag-Ps 738-759 is the testimony of H. E. Gilbert, Presirlent of tlw R L F&E. President Gilbert specifically stated
1s1·s
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that he did not know where the brochure labeled E:,
hibit 70 was produced. The only evidence that 1·t .
\\2'
produced in Cleveland is "testimony" of plaintiffs'
co·"
'
llJJ.
sel Mr. Rooker. There is no evidence whatsoever in 11 11•
record that preparation of that document was snpu
vised by the Grand Lodge officers of the BLF1&E. Tb,
record at pages 1103 and 1104 contains testimonv or
Mr. Trujillo, one of the plaintiffs. Mr. Trujillo stati,d
that he did not know where Exfobit P-60 was prepared.
The Union stamp on the back of that exhibit indicatei
it was printed in Salt Lake City. Trujillo said he dicffi!t
see Exhibit P-54 until about the time of the deb'1ti·
(March 24, 1967) or maybe "a little bit after the debate."
(R. 1104.) He doesn't say where Exhibit P-54 was pro.
duced. There is no evidence in the record as to who prepared these exhibits or where they were prepared, except
what is shown on the exhibits themselves. The exhibits
do not support Respondents' point.
Exhibit P-70 cited by Respondents in fact supports
defendants' position. That exhibit contains the following statement:
vVith BLF&E Representation a man get:
strike pay. (Exhibit P-70, page 1.) (Emphasis
added.)
That exhibit clearly shows that strike benefits were conditioned upon representation. One not represented Ii\
the Union (not in a bargaining unit represented by th1
BLF&E) was not entitled to benefits. (See
Brief [hereinafter cited as App. Br.] at 16-33.)
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}\Pspondents admit, by their reliance upon the record
.t" that Exhibits P-60, 70 and 54 were not used
tlteV Cl <'
imtil the final days of the campaign. This is in direct
contradiction to their statement found on pages 16 and
l7 of their brief that these exhibits were used "through. "
out the campaign.
Respondents cite R. 756-757 and Exhibits P-41 and
J).1G2 and 163 as -support for the proposition that:
Iman expressly requested authority from the
International President to promise all new members that they would receive strike benefits, and
Gilbert gave him that assurance, which was then
incorporated in a handbill circulated among plaintiffs. (Resp. Br. at 12.)
Those citations in no way support the quoted proposi-

tion. The record, at pages 756-757, reports testimony of
H. E. Gilbert, President of the Grand Lodge, BLF&E.
Mr. Gilbert stated that the quotation read to him by
connse1 for plaintiffs (Exhibit D-162) was correct. There
no request by Mr. Iman for authority in Exhibit D-162
or in tlrn record. Further, the quote states that Mr.
(iilbert assured new members they would receive strike
henefits "as spelled out in our Constitution." This would
c!Parly prohibit strike benefits to plaintiffs since the
BLF&E Constitution allows benefits only to those in a
hargaining unit represented by the Union and plaintiffs
were not in a bargaining unit represented by defendants.
(See App. Br. at 16-21.) Exhibits P-41 and D-163 are
to the same effect. Both indicate that the only authority
gn·Pn was to promise strike benefits "in accordance with
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the Com;titution." Further, Exhibit D-Hi;) <'IParh. ,',\(,,
1,
that Iman had not cleared his "strikP lwnd'it" ]ll'o,llii,,e,
with the Grand Lodge. (Exhibit D-1G:3, pag(· 2.)
·
The citation by Respondents to the R('<'Ol'(l ' ll'l.
1201-1202 and to Exhibits P-159 and D-U-! on pag" t
of their brief, is cornplett>ly inaccuratp and out of ('1Jn.
text. Mr. Iman testifiPd that lw did not know whetlitr
the "committee" actually talked to Mr. UilhPrt. \YJi, 11
Mr. Cole, a member of the "committeP," tt•stifit><l, Jllain
tiffs did not ask him.
(

The record
doPs not support tlt<· statt>mtn1
found on page 13 of R0spondPnts' lJl"iPf that cM'endan·
Grand Lodge ratifil'd "in all n•s1wcts'' thP a<'tiYity 11f
Mr. Iman. The citations to thP n•(•onl an• all to th·
testimony of :Mr. Iman and l\lr. Col<>. Cl<·arly, ratifica.
ti on of an agent's unauthorized arts cannot lw 1n·o1ed
from the month of the agPnt. Ev<>n if rati f'i<'ation (·01tl1]
be so proved - those pages of thP record eitt'd h: Re.
spondents do not contain any ratification. At pagP
the testimony refers to a period of tiuw prior to an:
by Iman. Clearly, a prinei pal ('annot rnt,/:
action before it happens. Page 1:217 contains nntltin:
remotely related to ratification. 'Tlw fad that (1illll'r:
never admonished Tman means hP <lidn 't kno\\· wh:r
Iman was doing, not that he approved of it.
and 1233 contain testimony of Mr. Co IP to tlw 1 f!'Pc'
that he had sent certain flyers to r.lr. UillH·rt, 11/11 r th"
strike began, to show him what WPnt on. ( 'lt'iHly. J[r
Gilbert did not ratify the conduct of BLlj\\'.E agent'
after the strike - at that timP he did jn:-;t t}H• opPMit
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_ he rrfus(•d to pay strike lwnefits to plaintiffs. Further, the law is dear that a party can only ratify acts
,rhieh it conld haYP anthorizPd initially. As set forth in
our IJl'l'\'ious Lrid, tlw Bl, F&E could never have authorizl·d strih l;Pnefits to tlwsc• plaintiffs. (App. Br. at

lG-33.)
RPspondents statP that nneonditional promises of
l>endits wen• rnadP h;.- defendants throughout the
conrse of tlw organizational campaign from Octolwr, 19(i(), to .Turn·, 19<>7. (RPsp. Br. at 15.) They cite

P-1.11, :21, 4-1. 7>1, 72 and 140. Tlwse <>xhibits
Qii1'

no snpport to tltat c·o11t(•ntion. (Se1• diseussion of
,;a!lll'

Pxliihits, i11/r((, at pagl's

On pag<' lfi of tlH·ir hriPf, Respondents cite interrog«ttory nnsw1·rs IJ>- plaintiff's in support of the propothat nn1·mHlitional promises were made "before
thP drhate on :Mareh :2-t, 10G7.'' These answers do not
l'lport. lurn·<·Y<·r,
stH'h promisPs were made -

whethl:'r two da:-·s li!'fon· or six months before. Note
!11at man.\ of tl1P plaintiffs (lid not join the BLF&E until
aflPr tlw dPhatP (.j[arel1 :2-1-, 1%7). (Exhibit D-190). The
1•Yidrnl'e is c!Par that any ::-;ueh promisPs were not made
m1til tlie titll(' of tl11· 1l1·liat<'. (SeP App. Br. at 10.)

.gro:;::-; h·.

eon tradirt themselYes and the
n·rord. ThP;.· intirnat(' that Exhibit P-54 was used all
dining tlw

eampaign and cite as authority
nf th1·ir own witn<'ss, Mr. Trujillo. (Resp. Br.

at 1G.) Th<'>" fail to ('i t1• tlw rest of Mr. Trujillo's testirnon.1 n•ganling Exhibit P-54, preYiously cited by Re9

spondents themselves on page 11 of thPir brid'. J[r
Trujillo stated, in response to a question as to wh ..!i
Exhibit P-54 was used:
I would say that this would havp had to hari·
been pretty close to the dehate, lwcansp it mi[l'l
have been a little bit after t}w ddmtP. (R. 11fl+.I:
This gross rnischaracterization of tlw evidt•nce sl1U11,8 th>
weakness of Respondents' case. There is no <'Yidene,
in the record to support a finding that Exhibit P-51
was used "throughout the campaign." Tht• evidence j,
to the contrary.
At page 17 of their brit•f, Respondents completf'!r
mischaracterize the hrief of dPf endants and tlw proeePd
to discredit their characterization; an obvious attf1mpt
to set up and knock down straw men. Although defondants deny the. authority of their represt•ntatives tn
make such promises, defendants have never asserted that
promises of strike benefits were not made prior to February, 1967. Defendants have assPrted, and the record
clearly shows, that unconditionn.l promises of strikP bm
fits were not made prior to that time. To that poin1.
strike benefits had been conditioned upon thP Constitu
tion of the BLF&E which grants bern·fits on!;· as rm1111erated therein. There is no evidenct> whatever in thl;
record showing unconditional promises being made prior
to that time. Respondents have pointed to none. '!'ht
citations in the record (R. 671 and lOGO-lOGl) purporteJ
ly supporting Respondents' position, do not do so. 'I'l1e
purported stipulation at page 671 of the n·cord
not
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arceph'<l hy plaintiffs and <>ven had it been, that stipulation referred to strik(' lwnefits "in accordance with the
Constitution." The stipulation at pages 1060-1061 also
refprred to strike hf•npfjt:-; in general. That stipulation
limits
promises of strike benefits re,r;ardless of tlw ontconw of thP election (unconditional
pwmisefi) to a period after the dPbat<-. (March 24, 1967).
Respondents cite Exhibit P-138 in support of their
propofiition that plaintiffs were included in the strike
(·all istmP.d hy defE•ndants. (Resp. Br. at 17.) That doculllt'nt sa,\·s nothing of the sort. It does state, in part:
Autl1orit,\· g-rantPd for peaceful withdrawal
effrcfrw 12:01
M.D.T. July 15, 1967, unless
s11tis11rtor.11 s!'ffleme11t can he attained in interim.
(Emphasis added.)

The italici:u•d portion of the above quote cl1::•arly shows
plaintiffs "·en• not inelndPd in the call. It refers to settlPnwnt of tlw disputt> hetwel'n the Union and the company. 'l'h<> Vnion only has the authority to obtain settlenwnts for those in tlw bargaining unit it represents.
(Rer> App. Br. at lG-21, 29-33.) Plaintiffs were not in
that unit and hencP wer1' not called out on strike by
defendants. (R. 1222-12:24.)
RPspondents, at pagP 18 of their brief, indicate that
wl1ilt> sening piekd duty they carried a placard stating
thPy WPre on strike on behalf of the BLF&E. In support of this proposition, they cite Exhibit P-73. Upon
examination of Exhibit P-73, it will be noted that there
nothing- contained thereon stating who carried that
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sign. This sign may well have been carried by on,, oi
the men in the bargaining unit represented hy thi·
BLF&E.
Respondents cite R. 141-142 on page 18 of tliPJ:
brief. This citation is to defendants' answer. It in
· no
way supports the proposition for which it is cited.
In the argument covering pages 18 through 21 of
their brief, Respondents assert that the strike vayroll
(Exhibit P-78) was valid. They seem to assert that a
document fraudulently conceived and filled ont by local
officers then signed by a Grand Lodge officer, with 110
knowledge of the fraud, is forever binding on the Union
even after the fraud is tmcovered. Officers of the dP
fendant Local 844 testified that they put plaintiffs' names
on the payroll (Exhibit P-78) knowing they w1,re placing them in improper categories. (Martin .Jensen, R.
1145-1146.) Such impropriety cannot bind the Grand
Lodge.
On page 20 of their brief, Respondents cite t]1P
BLF&E Constitution (Exhibit P-1, Article 10, Section
3 (h) [page 197]) for the proposition that strike benefit>
are "mandatory." This is not so. That provision statc1
that the payroll should be approved "if correct.'' The
evidence clearly shows the payroll (Exhibit P-78) '"as
not correct. (R. 1145-1146.) (See App. Br. at 12.)
Respondents then cite R. 296 for the proposition
that defendants paid strike benefits to persons not ,vithin
the bargaining unit in prior strikes. (R('SJJ. Br. at
12

()n page 92G of the record, Martin Jensen is speaking of
the strike involved in the prrsent suit (not a prior strike)
ann fnrther he states:
At the time T made out the payroll there were
no mernhers, to 111,'\' knowledge, that were not in
the bargaining unit.
Jensen then stated that he later found out that
three or four men were not in the unit. Respondents
hare completely misstated the record. There is no evidence in the record to show that any letter of explanation was amJended to the strike payroll when signed by
Brehany, the only officer of the Grand Lodge to
:<ign it.
On pages 22 and 23 of their brief, Respondents
indicate that President Gilbert knew as early as "No1Prnher 21, 19GG, that such unconditional promises of
hrnrfits ,,,ere b(-'ing made." For this proposition,
they cite nnmerons exhibits in the record, none of which
iwlieat(· in
way that President Gilbert was aware of
thL·m, and only one of which, Exhibit P-54, says anything
ah11ut nneonditional strikP benefits. The record clearly
e>tahlishes that Exhibit P-54 did not come out until
FPhrnar.'>' or March, 19G7. (R. 889-892; R. 1060-1062; R.
110-±: R 1181.) En>ry other one of these exhibits
'''h1eh speaks of strike henefi ts speaks of them "according to the
The Constitution clearly limits
hr·ndits to members of the bargaining unit represented
hY the BLF&E. (SPe App. Br. at 16-21.) Further, none
r)f the exhibits cited in support of this proposition contain an,v dates indicating when the purported representations WC'l'e made. :Most of those exhibits contain no
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dates at all. Such a shallow attempt to support thtir
position indicates clearly that Respondents can produc"
no evidence that President Gilbert was awar(" of' , hpromises prior to the commencement of this action.
Further on page 23 of their brief, Respondents misconstrue the evidence stating that defendants had "know].
edge for a fifteen-week period [prior to the strike] that
such unconditional promise [sic] of strike benefits had
been made to plaintiffs and defendants at no time informed the plaintiffs that they would not be paid." This
is entirely incorrect. There is no evidence that President
Gilbert had knowledge of these unconditional promise'
prior to the strike. Plaintiff Trujillo himself testified
that he helped gather up the flyers to send to President
Gilbert to show him what went on out here. (R. 11±21143.) This was after the strike had begun.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ITS FINDING
THAT VALID CONTRACTS HAD BEEN ENTERED
INTO BY PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS. THE
TERMS OF ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
UNION AND PLAINTIFFS WERE LIMITED BY
PROVISIONS OF THE UNION CONSTITUTION.
THE COURT FURTHER ERRED IN ITS FINDING
THAT ALLEGED CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BY
EMPLOYEES OF THE UNION WERE BINDING
UPON THE UNION.

1. The alleged agreement entered into by plaintiffs
and employees of defendant was clearly prohibited by the Union Constitution.

Point II, Sub-point 1 of Respondents' brief based
upon an entire,ly inaccurate reading of Article 10, Sretion
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the BLF&E Constitution. Section 3(a) of Article
10 states to whom strike benefits may be paid and the
1encral rate authorized to be paid. Sub-section (b) is mereJy a policy statement referring back to 3(a); it grants
which was not granted by 3(a). Thus, the
!imitations found in 3 (a), allowing strike benefits only
to "members and non-membe.rs engaging in a legal strike
authorized by this organization" are not affected by sub(h). As set forth in our previous brief, subsection 3(a) must be interpreted to mean "members or
non-mt>mbers" in the bargaining unit represented by
defendants. (App. Br. at 16-21; 30-33.)
2. Plaintiffs, as Union members, were not "similarly situated" to those other Union members
in the bargaining unit represented by the
BLF&E and hence were not entitled to strike
benefits.

Subparagraph 2 of Respondents' Point II is also
upon a misconcc>ption as to the facts. Respondents
state that union members "similarly situated" were entitled to the same benefits. This is absolutely true. This
is what defendants haYe argued from the beginning.
Tltt>re is no evidence whatsoever in this record that
anyone in the position of plaintiffs in this action has
!wen i11tc11tio11ally granted strike benefits. All persons
situated have been denied such benefits when
thPil'
has come to the attention of the
BLF&E. (Ree App. Br. at 6, 13, 14 and 15.) Further,
on page 27 Respondents state that "the obligation of the
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Union to represent and act on lwhalf oJ' all lnl'nil
.
. WJ,
of the same bargaini,ng unit in a fair and
.·
•· 111u
ntaory mannl'r is wt>ll established." This is ah:solut('j,
true. The cases cited by defendants do support tlii,
position. Howevl'r, note thP underlined portion of th,
foregoing quote from Respondents' hrid. 'l'hPy adiiut
that the obligation runs only to 11wmlwrs of the
bargaining unit. As has bePn S<'t forth in our prPriom
brief, the facts show that plaintiffs WPH' not llH·mber;
of defendants' bargaining unit. (R. 1223-1224.) (Ste
App. Br. at 16-21.) Respondents' wholP argUllll'nt in
this sub-point clearly supports dPf Pndants'
3. Respondents, as Union members, are not entitled to strike benefits allegedly promised by
employees of the Union if such promises were
contrary to the Union Constitution.

First, it should lw pointed ont that R<'spond(·nt;'
citation to the record in support of the>ir proposition that
"representatives stated that the lwnPfits w<'re guaranteed by the Constitution" (Resp. Br. at 28) is whoUY
erroneous. Respondents cite R. 39G-397, which, by !rt·
ter dated October 14, 1969, has bPen amf'rnkd to MU
R. 1060-1061. Even as anwndPd, this citation is (']rarh
erroneous. The citation is to the stipulation hL•tween
counsel for the parties and the>rn is no rnP1ition of thl'
word "guarantee" whatsoPver in this stipulation. h
support of their sub-point 3 in Point l I,
cite numerous insurance cases. Such casPs arP
inapposite. The instant casf' does not involn an insur
ance company, and Union strik<' lw1wfits an' in no \l'R 1
16

·111 111sn ranee henefit. These benefits
I 'f•nN1 t o <
•
l.k
are welfarE> hendits. Th(·y are WP!fare henefits offered
bY a union constitntion, unuPr certain conditions, to
;ernbrrs of a non-profit, unincorporatPd association.
11
attempt to likPn a union strike-benefits
program to immrance is a gross misapplication of the
Jaw and facts. R<·spondPnts cite no cases which even
remotd:-· suggest that insnrancP law should be applied
tn a strikP-lwm·fit situation.
tn hr

F,wn if the insurancP cases were applicable, the
erideJH'<' is c·!Par in this case that plaintiffs were repeah·dl>· shown the Constitution of tl1e BLF&E. (R.
10fi0.1()(i1.) The:-·
that on nnmerous occasions
th1 >. \\"f'l'P shown tl1<> Constitution, e._(J. (R. 832; 869; 951,
%i: 98:3) and speeifically page 105, r.g. (R. 850, 869;
0:52; 98:3). ,.\ltliongh tlw Constitution may be 300 pages
long, the portion of the Constitution relevant here is
ow· parti('nlar f'Prtion of that document. Plaintiffs' attempt to
on pag<> 1!l;) in order to obt.ain benefits
hnt say tlwy cannot lw lwld responsible to lmve read
19(i, wlii(·h is a rontinnation of the same section.
F'1trtlwr, plaintiffs eontinually characterize themselves
"nnt1ttorPd" and ''unlettered." The record in this
does not support that characterization. The record
,,Jt0m:; no 01w of plaintiffs who 'vas unable to read or
wnk FnrtliPr, the provisions which defendants rely
n1 11 m an· print1?d in tht> same size of type as those
upon wliirh plaintiffs attPinpt to rely. There has been
no attt>mpt in this Constitution to hide limitations on
thP
of strike h<>nefits. Section 3 ( e) of Article
lll
forth spl?<'ifieally, in language anyone can under-
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stand, that said strike benefits are directon- onl.
.
&J
Y
are not the basis of legal liability on the lJart ol' ·.
1 tl11
Brotherhood. There is nothing ambiguous about tlii,
language.
On page 31 on their brief, Respondents cite Hi;i.
ningson v. Bloomfield JJI otors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
69 ( 1960). This is a case involving the manufacturer\
disclaimer of warranty in a product's liability action.
How that case has any relevance to the instant situation
is impossible to understand. Further, the record is
lutely clear, and it was stipulated by counsel for plain
tiffs, that plaintiffs had access to a copy of the Consti.
tution from the time they joined the Union. (R. 1060
1061.) Thus, in order to understand strike benefits, al:
plaintiffs had to do was read one page in the Constih1tion. Several of them mentioned that "page 195" ww
repeatedly pointed out to them. (R. 850; 869; 952; 983i
At trial, Respondents knew even the page number of
the part they wished to rely upon, but now they assert
that they could not even read the next page of the Constitution due to their "limited education." The BLF&E
is an unincorporated association made up of memher1,
many of whom have this same "limited education.'' Th'
members themselves drafted the Union Constitution
All of the members are bound hv their Constitution, R'
was set out in our previous brief. (App. Br. at lo-21,
29-37.) One member cannot assert a benefit he is not
entitled to against other members simply by stating he
has "limited education."
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J{espondents state that most of the plaintiffs did
110 t ]uffe access to the BLF&E Constitution "until a later
datt\'' insinuating that plaintiffs did not get the Consiitntion until sometime after they had joined the Union.
l [(esp. Hr. at 31.) This is cl
contrary to the record
Tlw record is absolutely clear that
[A] copy of the BLF&E Constitution was either
gin'n or made available to these plaintiffs before
or ution joining. (R. 1060.)

FnrtlJPr, the testimony of plaintiffs themselves shows
tiiat
had access to the Constitution. (R. 850; 869;
!)52; 983.)
rrhe insurance cases cited by Re·spondents under this

Point are all based upon ambiguity in the written document. ThP Constitution of the BLF&E expressly states
that the provisions as to strike benefits are directory
only and cannot be the basis for legal liability. There
is no ambiguity whatsoever in Article 10, Section 3 ( e).
'l1liat provision states in part:
The provisions of this section concerned with

liaynwnt of strike benefits are directory only,
and shall not be the basis of any legal liability
on the part of the Brotherhood.

1-'he foregoing clause is not susceptible of more than
onP interpretation. There is nothing in that clause which
:t court can construe. Respondents assert no other conc'.trnetiou of this provision - they seem to ignore it,
citing cases based upon ambiguity but pointing to ne>
amhignity in the provision relied upon by Appellants.
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In addition, on page 32 Respondents all1""P
that, th,\']I
b·
comprehension of their bargain was "undonhtPdlv''
!··
•
(t
termined by what they read in the Union campaign lf·af
lets. It is amazing that plaintiffs, being so "untutori·d"
and "unlettered" could read the campaign leaflets _
especially that they could read Exhibit P-54 which pur.
ports to be material copied directly from tlw BLF&E
Constitution which they allege they cannot read. TliP
absurdity of this argument becomPs evident upon it,
statement. A Union welfare program in the form n!
strike benefits can in no way be likened to commercial
insurance transactions. rrhe reliance and f'Xpedation,
of both classes are in no way similar.
4. Rights of Union members to receive Union
funds are clearly governed by the provisions of
the Union Constitution.

Plaintiffs' citation of Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d
323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965) is clearly inapposite in
case. There is no ambiguity whatsoever in the disclaimer
of liabili tieis found in Article 10, Section 3 (e) of the
BLF&E Constitution. That provision is not at all SUE·
ceptible to two interpretations and need not be intPr.
preted by a court. See di·scnssion, i»1fra.
5. The defense of ultra vi res is clearly available to
defendants.

On page 34 of their brief, Respondt'nts state that
the defense of Ultra vires is not available to defen<lant;
and in support of this proposition cite the Utah Corpora
tions Code, Utah Code Annotated, Section
20

Tim; citation is clearly inapplicable. As Respondents
are ·well aware, the BLF&E is not a corporation. It is

an unincorporated association and clearly not covered
by the Utah Corporations Code. The cases cited by
Respondents have nothing to do with the defense of
1dtra vires.
R.espondents state that the decision in Amalgamated
('/nt!ii11g Workers v. Kiser, 174 Va. 229, 6 S.E.2d 562
(1939) and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joinrrs v. JJioore, 206 Va. 6, 141 S.E.2d 729 (1965) could
not have been reached under Utah Code Annotated Sectio 16-6-23. This is absurd. The Utah Corporations
Code does not cover unincorporated associations and in
no way can it be said that this provision would prevent
a result as reached in those cases. Those cases are
squarely in point with the instant case and both hold
that union members cannot recover on promises made
by employees of the union when said promises are outside the scope of the union constitution. All of the cases
f'ited by Respondents are cases involving facts not aprlicable to the instant case. It will be noted that Rehave not bothered to cite the facts of any
of the cases upon which they rely. Further, Respondents
lian not distinguished the clearly controlling cases set
forth in Appellants' brief.
The defense of ultra vires, a valid common-law defose, as it relates to unincorporated associations, has
1wt hePn changed by statute in Utah. The statute cited
hy plaintiffs concPrning the ultra vires defense, Utah
('odf, Annotated 16-G-23, is m derrogation of the com-

21

mon law and must be verv stricth- constn1Pd m1 1( t
•
·
·
t
' satute cited by Respondents refers to non-profit corporations. The Unions involved as defendants in thi's casf'
are not non-profit corporations. Had the legislature
wished to include unincorporated associations in thi,
statute, it would have done so. There is a sound policy
dictating a difference where unincorporated association's
of members are involved. These associations are made
up of individual members, none of whom are obtaining
profit from the association. The defense is especially
applicable when one group of members is
to profit from another group by an ultra vires act. Each
member, when he joins the group, is entitled to re]Y
upon the protection of the Constitution. One member
should not be allowed to recover on an unconstitutional
obligation against a fund created by and for other members. Each has the duty to know and understand the provisions of the constitution. See App. Br. at 34, 25-29.
The cases cited by Appellants in their previous brief
are apposite and clearly the law. Respondents have
cited no cases holding otherwise. The cases cited by
Respondents as support for their proposition that the
labor union should be treated as a corporation were all
cases involving suits by an outsider against a labor
union. None of those cases involved intra-union qnestions such as are involved in the instant case. This is
clearly a distinguishing factor and while it may not be
unjust to allow an outsider to recover against the labor
union as if it were a corporation, it would be
unfair to allow recoverv bv one member against a funJ
created by other members. for a specific constitutional
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purpose unless that purpose were fulfilled. Under the
Jaw, all union members are bound by the same constitution. It is noteworthy that plaintiffs make no attempt
to distinguish Pratt v. Amalgamated Association of
Stffet and Electrical Railway Employees, 50 Utah 472,
l(i7 Pac. 830 ( 1917), ::t Utah case which is clearly controlling in this situation. They sidestep that issue by
stating that it is "ontdated and wholly unjustifiable."
(RPsp. Br. at 37.)
POINT III
THE COURT MAY NOT ALTER THE CONTRACTUAL LIABILITIES OF A LABOR UNION REGARDING STRIKE BENEFITS TO ITS MEMBERS WHICH
ARE SET FORTH IN THE UNION CONSTITUTION.

Point III of Respondents' brief, beginning at page
38, clearly misreads Point III of Appellants' brief.
spondents continnally argue that Appellants are asserting that the court has no jurisdiction because of the
provisions of the Union Constitution. This is clearly
incorrect. The Appellants, in point III of their previous
briPf, merely assert that the provisions of the Union
Constitution regarding liability for strike benefits may
not he ignored by the court. Appellants further argue
that those provisions are binding upon Union members.
The cases cited in Appellants' brief clearly sustain this
argument. Respondents have not bothered to distinguish
those eases. Appellants have not argued that he court
sl1011ld be precluded from taking jurisdiction over the
action hy the BLF&E Constitution. The only argument
made hy Appellants is that the court, in a dispute between a union and a nnion member, should be bound
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by the provisions of the union constitution and Rhon]d
not grant recovery contrary to those provisions which
are binding upon all members. There is clearlv•. no,.TlOlation of due process involved. Respondents havp triPd
to create a Constitutional Due Process argument of
straw so that they can knock it down for its impart 011
the court.
Appellants have never asserted that plaintiffs in
this case had no remedies in court. Appellants haw
asserted, and still assert, that plaintiffs had a duty to
exhaust their intra-union remedies prior to going to
court. Thus, Respondents' argument at page 43 of its
brief regarding arbitration agreements is clearly another
straw man. Appellants do not quarrel with the authorit>
cited by the Respondents that the Utah rule is against
arbitration agreements. However, Appellants have never
asserted that the Constitution of the BLF&E constituted
an arbitration agreement precluding plaintiffs from seeking court action. The Constitution of the BLF&E in no
way prevents a member from seeking conrt action. It
is notable that tlw respondents have cit0d no section of
the Constitution for their assertion. Appellants havr
never argued that Respondents should "so confine. their
dispute." Appellants do not assert that the
above cited in the BLF&E Constitution "purports to
confer final judicial authority on private arbitratrm
and tends to divest thP official courts of jnrisdieti0n."
This was a problem with thP. arbitration clause imolren
in Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees' Insurance Co111painy, 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965). Appellanti
have never felt there was anything akin to an arbitra24

tion agreement involved in the instant case. Article 10,
Section 3 ( e) of the BLF&E Constitution merely states
that the provisions on strike benefits do not create a
legal liability upon defendants. All defendants ask the
eonrt to do is to interpret that Constitution in the only
way that it can possibly be interpreted - the provisions
on strikr benefits may not create a binding obligation
un the Union. Upon such an interpretation, plaintiffs
in this case cannot recover.
POINT IV
DEFENDANTS HA VE NOT WAIVED ANY RIGHT
TO Lil\IIT STRIKE BENEFITS BY REASON OF
EARNINGS OF THE PLAINTIFFS FROM OUTSIDE
SOURCES. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ESTOPPED
FROM ASSERTING SUCH A LIMITATION.

Throughout their brief, Respondents repeatedly
rt>fer to plaintiffs as if there were only one plaintiff.
It should he noted that this was a spurious class action
anu 190 separate plaintiffs were allowed to intervene.
Thul',
are 191 plaintiffs. Except for common
41wstions of law and fact, each of these plaintiffs must
rirove his ffwn case. At page 48 of their brief, Respondents state:
There is evidPnce that some of the plaintiffs
wen' ad,·ised and assured by representatives of
def Prnlants, including Mr. L. L. Iman, who was
in charge of the campaign, and Mr. Brehany, the
TntPrnational Vice President, that the Union had
nt>wr invoked the $150.00 limitation on earnings,
and would not do so.
If the evidence does, in fact, say what Respondents assert, and it seems equivocal on that point, such a repre-
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sentation can only aid the person to whom it was 11 d
<•
ia "
or communicated. That certainly cannot lw frPatp<l a.,
a common question of fact since all plaintiff 8 wel'e nrir
even present. The fact that Mr. Fred Oneida
have been so informed cannot sustain thP claim of am
other person that he was also so informt>d. Each plam
tiff had the obligation to show facts com;tituting an
estoppel if he intends to rely on estoppPl. As to a ma
jority of the plaintiffs, there is no evidence what:;oevei
in this record which would sustain an estoppel witl'
respect to the outside-earnings limitation. -With the ex
ception of the two or three plaintiffs who testified that
representations were made to them, the court's finding
with regard to an estoppel is clearly not supported bi
the evidence and should be reversed.
Further with respect to the claimed estoppel, at
page 48 of their brief, Respondents refer to affidavit>
supposedly "used as recruiting tools to induce plaintiffs to join defendants." In support of this
they cite the record at pages 878 and 880 (Testimony
of plaintiff Oneida). This is a completely inaecurate
and false characterization of the evidence set forth in
the record. With regard to these affidavits, Mr.
stated, "I don't believe they were ever used."
Since evidence of plaintiff's own witnesses indicates that
these affidavits were nPver use-d, they can certainly givp
no support to the court's finding regarding an Pstoppel.
In support of their estoppel argument on page .J:9
of their brief, Respondents make a completely inacruratl'
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f, . ·ice to Article 10, Section 3 (i) of the BLF&E Conrp,cre1

stitution. Respondents state:

Read in its entirety, that Constitutonal provision required that defendants pay to their strikino· members strike benefits for a period of at
le:st thirty ( 30) days, and that thereafter "all
officers and members of the organization" extend "every possible assistance to find employment for members on strike". (Emphasis added.)
It is submitted that the use of the word "thereafter"
bY Respondents is completely inaccurate and mischarac-

terizus that portion of the BLF&E Constitution. Since
the Constitution speaks for itself, Appellants urge that
conrt to read that particular provi·sion.
On pages 49 and 50 of their brief, Respondents
allege that defendants made no attempt to ascertain the
n1onthly earnings of their members during the time strike
IJl'nPfits were being paid or were payable. The citations
to the record given do not support this proposition. Interrogatories answered by plaintiffs clearly show that
cMendants made inquiries. There is absolutely no evidence in the record as to whether defendants disqualified
any members dnring the 1967-68 nation-wide copper
Respondents' statement that "defendants admittedly did not disqualify a single member from strike
lwnefits during the 1967-68 nationwide copper strike
reason of outside earnings during the course of the
(Resp. Br. at 50) is not supported by the evidence. Respondents cite as support the tesimony of
.\lartin Jensen, the Financial Secretary of the BLF&E.
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This tPstimony does not snpport Respondents' }Jro .
•
110,1.
hon. . Mr. Jensen stated that it was not his .J·oh t0 (),.
.
1
qualify members for ontsid<=' earnings and that
fore he liad not donP so. lfo did not ::-;tat<> that thP BLF&E
had not done so or made inquiries. (R. 929-9:30.) Fur.
ther, tlw interrogatory amnvers of def Pndants to whicli
Respodents cite werP never offpred or admitt<•d in Pri
dence. Therefor0, they are not before tlw court and weri
not before the trial court for determination of the
Reliance cannot be had upon these interrogatories anrl
answers. Even if reliance could be had upon the answeri,
the answers do not state that defendants rnadP no in.
qmne·s.
According to the Constitution of the BLF&E, Articli
10, Section 3 ( i), a memher Parning in PXC('Ss of
per month should cut himself off from strike benefib
by notifying the President of his earnings. J£ach member has a duty to notify the International President
to his earnings and the International President mus!
then notify the General Secretary and Treasurrr tn
remove such member's name from tlw payroll. ri1hal
section allows the International President to
affidavits of members regarding their earnings, hut it
does not require him to do so. Affidavits in the form of
interrogatory answers were required of plaintiffs i11
this suit because it came to the attention of the Inter
national President that many of thPm were working at
outside jobs. Had other incidences of earnings come 111
the attention of the International President, hP m1tlo11hl_
edly would have acted in the same mann0r witl1 rpgaro
to those members.
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At page 50 of their brief, Respondents state:
E. H. Brehany, International Vice President,
was hinrnelf present on one occasion during the
organizational campaign when one of the plaintiffs Pxpressly infornwd those assembled that he
had another job which would provide him earnings exePeding $150.00 per month during any
strike, and was nevertheless assured by the Defendant Local's President that he would be eligi11le for strike lwnefits. (R. 1006). Brehany took
no exception to that assurance.
As set forth in the Constitution previously cited, it is
the duty of each member to report his earnings to the
Presidt'nt. The Constitution puts no burden on the International Vice President to make such a report. Further, if in fact such conduct could be the basis of an
estoppel, only thos(_• who ·were present on that occasion
or who rPliPd on he statement could take advantage of it.
There is nothing in the record indicating whether any of
thr plaintiffs other than Mr. Lindauer were present on
that occasion or relied on that statement. Thus, none of
tit(' plaintiffs 0xeept l\T r. Lindauer could use such evidenrc· to su1iport an estoppel. The trial court erred in
finding ddendants estopped from asserting this limitation. The facts of the case do not support such a finding
for eaelt of the plaintiffs.

On page 51 of their brief, Respondents cite the record at pagvs 7H7-SSO, 1002-1004, for the proposition that
'\k'frndants fa lsdy represented to plaintiffs that, des:iih0 tlw langnagE' of the Constitutional provision on out,,jr]p earnings, the same had not in the past and would
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not now be invoked against the plaintiffs." Respondent.'
citation to pages 787 to 880 is compldely unintellig-ible
They cite 100 pages of the record and it is impossible \(i
know to what they ref er. Pages 1002-1004 con fain tii"
testimony of Mr. Fred Lindauer only. Such a statement
cannot be the basis for an estoppel finding on the part
of all plaintiffs. If, in fact, that evidence is the basi)
for an estoppel, it can only be applicable to plaintiff
Lindauer. The process of intervention in a spurious clasi
action does not remove the burden on each plaintiff to
prove his case. Certainly, reliance sufficient to support
an estoppel is not a common question of fact.
On page 52 of their brief, Respondents allege that
defendans knew that BLF&E members had earned in excess of $150.00 per month during prior strikes and that
defendants knew that their representatives WPre assuring plaintiffs that no Constitutional limitation was imnked then and that defendants knew that numerous members receiving strike benefits in 1967-68 strike had earned
in excess of $150.00 per month. In support of thi8, Rµ.
spondents cite Exhibit P-1, R. 158, 215, 878-880, 898,
929, 934-935 and 1002-1004. Exhibit P-1 is the BLF&E
Constitution. Record 158 is plaintiffs' interrogatories li
defendants. Record 215 is defendants' answtirs to plaiutiffs' interrogatories, vd1ich were never offered or admitted in evidence. Record 878-880 and 898 is testirnon1
of plaintiff Oneida. RPcord 929, 934-935 is testi11111 n:
of Martin Jensen. Record 1002-1004 is testimony oi
plaintiff Lindauer. None of the foregoing citations gin
any indication as to what was knou·n
dPf Pndant UraJ11i
Lodge. It is submited that tlH• evidence clearly indicatei
1
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that dd'endant Urand Lodge was not aware that any

of these promises had been made until after the cominenrement of the strike. Mr. Trujillo himself, one of
the plaintiffs, testified that he gathered up flyers and
lirncinll'f'S nsed "out here" to send to Mr. Gilbert to show
]Jim "·hat went on. (R. 1142-1143.)
POINT V
IT WAS NOT WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION TO ALLOW COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS
TO CIRCULARIZE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS TO
INTERVENE, AND IN SO DOING THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED.

The cases cited by Respondents in their brief, page
:J±, for the proposition that plaintiffs had a right to
eircularize notice of the spurious class action are equivocal and not controlling. The correct rule is set forth by
JustirP Piehtt in his dissent in U·nion Carbide and
Carbon Corportion 'i·. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir.
19G2).
it would serve no purpose to recite the
judge's excellent work, Appellants here recommend it
to this court.
York v. Guarantee Tnist Company of New York,
1-:J.'.3 F.2d 503 (1944) was an action by certain note holdPr::; for thcmsPln.'s and on behalf of others similarly
These notes had been sold to the public through
Guarantee rrrust Company of New York. The relevant
portion of the opinion begins on page 528 where disis had n'garding limitations and laches as to
these unnamed plaintiffs who had not yet intervened.
TliP eourt held that such plaintiffs could intervene and
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advantage of the position of the named plaintifh
m that respect. The question was whether such notr·
holders conld intervene after judgment. Since the " ,
came up on appeal from the summary judgment grantrrJ
for defendants, there was no judgment in the cast> whicli
unnamed plaintiffs could participate in. The case
remanded and as far as research shows, was never re.
tired. Thus, even though the court does state that "ap
propriate steps be taken to notify all note holders to
intervene (if they have not theretofore done so)" this i,,
clear dictum and so far as reported no such notice was
ever granted as allowed.
In Hormel v. United States, 17 FRD 303 (S.D.XJ
1955) the court denied a motion by the named plaintiff,
for an order directing that appropriate steps be taken
to notifq all persons sirnlarly situated to intervene in
the action, decision in whch was being appealed by defendant. In clear dictum, the court stated:
I can see nothing wrong about the plaintiffs
circularizing all others with similar claims against
the Government.
This was not the motion be of er the court. The court in
the Hormel case went on to enumerate the many possible
abuses to this process and in response to plaintiffs' arguments attempting to sustain notice, stated:
The natural answer to those argument'
would be that these plaintiffs are not their broth·
ers' keepers. H onncl v. United States, :mpra,
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rehe court goes on to state:

If litigants are to be given any such novel
and revolutionary rights, courts should be authoriv•d by statute or court rule to accord it. Hormel
v. United States, supra.
ri1ltis is c!Parly def Pndants' position in the instant case
and as expressed
defendants' prior brief, no such action ran be allowed absent proper legislation. The solicitation carried ont in the instant case under the apparent
authority and recognition of the court is clearly prejlldicial to defendants and contrary to the law.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE MEASURE OF
DAMAGES USED TO COl\IPUTE THE JUDGMENT.
1. Damages must be limited to those damages

proximately attributable to the plaintiffs' reliance upon the actions of defendants' agents.

At page 55 of their brief, Respondents shrug off
AppPllants' argument with regard to damages by the
nwre statement that these arguments are "irrelevant,
lwcanse plaintiffs relied upon something other than the
apparent authority of defendants' agents to make the
nrnd(·.'' Yet, Respondents cite no evidence in the record of any actual authority given to defenclants' employees to make such representations. It
is snhmittccl that the record is devoid of any evidence
inrlieating actual authority for such representations. Furtlw Constitution of the BLF&E, Exhibit P-1, clearly
limits tl1e scope of any such representations as set forth
ah°' P. The only possible theory of recovery remaining
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to Respondents is one based upon apparc•nt autli 01'1(\·
Respondents make no response to Appellants'
l)J'( .· ·
'
'\ 11111 .•
arguments relating to the measure of daman·es
,
.
1111•11
h'
apparent authority is involved. Appellants rely 011 tb
argument. (App. Br. at 52-57.)
2. Estoppel is not a substitute for consideration
and the measure of damages to a plaintiff who
has relied upon the apparent authority of defendants' agents to make representations are
those damages proximately attributable to
plaintiffs' reliance upon the actions of def end.
ants' agents.

Respondents' argnm\Cmt at page fl5 of tlwir hrii·f
that estoppel is a substitute for consideration and tlin1.
fore a plaintiff who has relied should receive thP vah11·
of the contract is wholly without merit. The casr reliPd
upon by Respondents, Easton v. Wycoff, 295 P.2d
is completely miscited by Respondents. That case i11
volved an oral agreement to leasP real estate. Tlt1
action was by the lessee to recover damages for hrPnrl
of contract when the lessor refused to sig-n a writt1c
lease. The lessee's theory was that the statnt<:> of fraud·
could not be relied upon by the lessor sinee in fact tl1
lessor had agreed to reduce the oral agreement to writint
and had never done so. rrhe case in no
holds that
estoppel is a substitute for consideration on a contnll'L
In fact, the case holds that there was no estop1wl mi
the facts presented. Dictum in the case
1rha
is required to invoke estoppel against a dr·frmw bafPli
upon the statute of frauds. In dictum the court stair'
that under certain circumstances estoppel might lw '
1
•

1
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snbstitute for part performance in order to take an oral
out from under the statute of frauds. How-,.,r the facts were not present in that case to justify
t'\ \ '
an estoppel. Hespondents' citation to II Williston, Contrnds, 8eetion 553A is unintPlligible to counsel for defrndants. No such section or volume has been found
and JwncP no rc sponse to that citation can be given. The
(·i!ations to the Restatment given are completely inappo:o;ite. Section 20 is entitled "Requirement of Manifestation of Mutual Assent" and refers to ways in which
mut1wl assent to a contract can be given. Section 90
refrrs to "Promises Rc>asonably Inducing Definite and
Action" and has nothing to say about estopJH'l being a snhstitute for consideration. In all the illustrations ginn und(•r 8ertion 90, tlwre was consideration
in the form of substantial performance. If plaintiffs
an, awarded any damages, said damages must be limited to those proximately caused by their reliance, as set
forth and supported in Appellants brief at pages 52
through 57.
1

II' plaintiffs m fact relied upon defendants' repre,oentations to the extent of paying dues and performing
'trike duty, no evidence as to the extent of such reliance
fonnd in the record. There is no evidence as to how
man) times each plaintiff performed strike duty, or as
to tlw amount he paid in dues. The record, in fact,
rndicates that most of the plaintiffs were suspended for
non1myment of dues in August and September of 1967.
Thie: \ras on<-' month after the strike began. (Exhibit
P-190.) lf there was any reliance upon the part of
J'laintiffs as far as the record goes, said reliance was

miniscule and cannot be the basis for the f'-'"
'-vO\'en
granted in the trial court. In the minutes of the loi;i
lodge membership meeting of .July 27, 1967, it is statfi[
that during this strike members' dues would be rE'duepil
to $1.85 per month. That same minute Pntry states thai
picket assignments would be six hours eYery other \\'eek
(Exhibit P-72.) At most, said recoyery should br lim
ited to the damage proximately incurred hy plaintiff,
due to their reliance, e.g. refund of dues paid or pay.
ment for hours worked on picket duty. Even if
ment Section 90 were applicable, the examples 8tatel.
therein all contain instances wherein consideration in
the fonn of substantial perf onnance was given by tlir
promissee. In the fourth example where the
did not make any substantial iwrformance, the exarnpJ,
holds the promissor's promise is not binding,
>1q1
porting defendants' theory set forth in its pre.vions brief.
POINT VII
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THIS ACTION IS PREEMPED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT.

At pages 56 and 57 of their brief,
state that there is evidence in the record that a prnrn111
of strike benefits regardless of election result' 11:1.·
made from the inception of the campaign. In snp1 111 r'
of this proposition, Respondents cite the record at
671. Upon perusal of page 671 in the record, the c1111 : 1
will find that this is a stipulation offered L;-'
for defendants and never accepted by couns<·l for
tiffs. Further, the stipulation stah>s that:
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The benefits of membership in the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen were
pointed out to these people as part of the organization campaign and that included within such
benefits was that with reference to the payment
of strih benefits in accordance with the Constitution.
Tlii;; 1rns no admission of unconditional promises of

strik(" benefits. It states that strike benefits were promiHed in accordance with the Constitution. As explained
in our }Jrevions brief, the Constitution clearly limits the
pa>1nent of strike benefits to members of the bargaining
unit represented by the BLF&E. (App. Br. at 16-29.)
Rrspoudents cite the\ stipulation found on pages 1060
and 10(11 of the rt>cord. That stipulation states:
From and after the debate between the competing labor organizations in the election cam24, 1967, it was represented to plainpaign,
tiffs that they would be paid strike benefits if
they were members in good standing and voted
for thP BLF&E at the NLRB election regardless
of the outcome of such election.
is not an unconditional guarantee from the
/i,»1 of the campaign. '11 his stipulation was specifically
limited to the period after l\farch 24, 1967. Further, this
stipulation required that members vote for the BLF&E
in the
election. There is no evidence whatsoever
in the record that any of the plaintiffs voted for the
BLF&E in thP NLRB election. As a matter of fact,
d»f Pndnnts lost the election. This citation to the record
clear].\· (loP:-i not support the position alleged by plaintiffs.
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As further support for this proposition, Respond
1
ents cite Exhibits P-1, P-11, P-21, P-±1, J>-51 p_70
'
anr1
P-140. These exhibits do not support the proposition
for which they are cited. Exhibit P-1 is the BLF&E
Constitution which clearly limits strike benefits to lllern.
bers of the Union in the bargaining unit represented ln ,
the Union. Exhibit P-11 says nothing whatsoever aboi;t
1
unconditional promises of strike benefits. It mereh
states the opinion of one man regarding
made as to strike benefits. It says nothing about what :
these commitments were.
1

Exhibit P-21 speaks of unconditional guarantees bnt
the man who wrote that letter states that he did not
arrive in Utah until after the debate. Hence, any c01n
ments he makes regarding promises of strike benefil1
must refer to a time after March 24, 1967, and cannot
be said to apply "from the inception of the campaign."
Exhibit P-41 is a letter to H. E. Gilbert from Carl
L. Morelli. This letter speaks of unconditional promisei
with respect to the date of the March 24 dtibate. Thii
letter in no way supports the proposition that such unconditional promises were made from the beginning of
the campaign.
Exhibit P-72 contains excerpts from thP
of
the meetings of Lodge 844, BLF&E. At no place in
these minutes is there any specific mention of striln·
benefits, much less unconditional promises of :;trik'
benefits.
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1

EJxhibit P-140 is apparently a draft of a brochure.
Tt is undated, contains pencilled in and lined out pro:visions and contains no reference whatsoever to strike
benefits regardless of election outcome. The only referi·neP to strike hern•fits is found in the first paragraph
1rherr it staks:
The Brotherhood pays strike benefits directly
to members. This one fact alone make·s the Company respect our bargaining power. Hundreds of
thousands of dollars in strike benefits have been
paid to Brotherhood members at Bingham Canyon down through the years. (Emphasis added.)
The ahon'-quoted statement specifically relates payment of strike benefits to bargaining power. As set
forth in our previous brief, this is absolutely true. Only
those people for whom the BLF&E could bargain, those
in the bargaining unit represented by the BLF&E, were
eligible under the BLF&E Constitution to obtain strike
benefits. (App. Br. lG-29.)
At page 58 of their brief, Respondents state:
The record in this case establishes that plaintiffi", in an effort to determine whether or not
defrndants' preemption argument had any merit,
sought an official determination by filing a charge
with the National Labor Relations Board.
Rrspondents go on to state the nature of their alleged
action. Notable, however, is the absence of any citation
to the record. The record in this case does not establish
any snch c·fforts by anyone.
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POINT VIII
SECTION 501 OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT PREVENTS
RECOVERY BY PLAINTIFFS IN THIS ACTION.

On page 64 of their brief, Respondent8 state that:
The fact that dcf endants paid strike
to some of their members engaging in this
strike, as the record clearly establishes, should be
sufficient to establish beyond doubt that no claim
is or can be made that defendants did not authorize the strike.
In support of this proposition, Respondt•nts citP the record (R. 917-939, and Exhibits P-179 to 84 [sic]). The
record cited is the testimony of }\f artin .frnsen and it
clearly indicates that defendants knowingly paid strike
benefits only to those memlwrs in the bargaining unit
which they represented. These were the only persons
for which the BLF&E could authorize a strike. The
testimony further indicates that the only members outside the bargaining unit who
paid strike benefits
were paid erroneously and without knowlPdge of the
fact that they were not in the bargaining unit. Such
information did not come to the attention of the BLF&E
until the strike was over. (R. 926-928.) The citations
to Exhibits P-179 to 84 are completely unintelligible.
These exhibits are all flyers put out by the Mine-Mill
and Smelter Union. They have absolutely no relevance
to the proposition for which they are cited by respond·
ents.

40

